Significant OPORDs

 

Below is a list of all significant OPORDs either issued by 1-12 CAV or issued to 1-12 CAV from November 2006 – September 2007, brigade daily FRAGOs have not been included in this compilation.  Some BDE OPORDs may have inadvertently been omitted if they did not significantly affect or change battalion operations.

 

The OPORDs with dates highlighted in red font are important in that they significantly changed or set the strategic focus of the battalion on the operational level.  Note that dates are publication dates, execution dates are obviously later.  Also note that in many cases a WARNO or MOD of the original OPORD is used where the base document was destroyed by a virus or was otherwise unrecoverable.  See below for brief summaries of highlighted OPORDs:

 

FRAGO 3 to OPORD 06-04 (SAEED AL ARANIB), 14DEC06

 

This was a multi-week battalion operation which cleared all of Baqubah proper in partnership with the Iraqi Army.  The operation also set the kinetic tone of the battalion’s daily operations for the next 6 months.

 

WARNORD (sic) 01 to OPORD 07-01 OPERATION TURKI BOWL II, 19DEC06

 

Battalion (+) operation in conjunction with 5-73 RSTA.  The fact that this operation was nearly 100 KM from FOB WARHORSE and as far south as Baghdad serves to highlight the sheer immensity of the 1-12 CAV AO.  Significant risk was assumed throughout the battle space for the duration of this operation.  Remaining units were unable to conduct much more than only fixed-site security during this time period.

 

FRAGO 26 (SHAKE THE SHEIK II) to OPORD 07-01 (ISOLATE BAQUBAH)

 

Battalion air and ground assault to raid the Al Qaeda strong-hold of Imam Ways and free suspected Al Qaeda prisoners.  41 Al Qaeda prisoners were freed during this operation.

·  The success of this air-assault, especially by a heavy battalion “officially” untrained in these types of operations, set the stage for several additional air-assaults in support of OPERATION ARROWHEAD RIPPER.

·  The public relations value of this mission contributed greatly to destroying enemy morale and was a major turning point in the fight for Baqubah.

·  Many of the prisoners freed were either being held for ransom in order to finance AQIZ activities, or forcefully being trained as suicide bombers and as VBIED drivers.  This raid was a major operational blow to the Baqubah insurgency.

 

OIF OPORD 07-04 (OPERATION ARROWHEAD RIPPER), 7JUN07

 

Major division level operation involving 2100 surge reinforcements to Baqubah (1800 additional soldiers stationed at FOB WARHORSE and 300 additional soldiers stationed at FOB GABE) and 1500 additional Iraqi Army soldiers.  Successfully liberated Baqubah from Al Qaeda forces, drove a wedge between AQIZ and the local population, and set the conditions for Reconciliation operations.

 

1-12 CAV OPORD 07-02 (CHARGER ARROW), 13JUN07

 

This BN OPORD detailed the 1-12 CAV’s orders as part of OPERATION ARROWHEAD RIPPER.  While 1-23 IN and 5-20 IN cleared west Baqubah along with A/1-12 CAV, 1-12 CAV isolated west Baqubah by blocking lines of communication and by disrupting in east Baqubah.  Upon clearance of west Baqubah, 5-20 IN shifted to Old Baqubah in the east in order to conduct detailed clearance operations in that part of the city.

 

FRAGO 15 (BONE TAHRIR COMBINED MEDICAL ENGAGEMENT) to OPORD 07-02 (Charger Arrow), 29JUN07

 

After nearly 8 months of heavy combat and major kinetic clearing operations this operation was one of the first battalion size civil-military operations.  At this time, clearing operations were not yet complete on the east side of Baqubah, but this operation marked a strategic turning point from a more kinetic approach to a Reconciliation based approach.

 

MOD 3 (OPERATION LORAX) to FRAGO 29 (Charger Arrow – Isolate O.B.) to OPORD 07-02 (Charger Arrowhead), 23JUL07

 

Along with OPERATIONS WICKERSHAM I & III, this operation was one of several kinetic clearing operations in the villages and palm groves immediately north and immediately south of Baqubah.  These outlying village operations were conducted after completion of operations to clear the main built-up areas of the city.  These operations were important in that they were conducted to drive the insurgency from all remaining safe havens around the outskirts of the city.  In conjunction with these operations the battalion began to shift the focus of its company/platoon fight to standing up CLN based neighborhood watch programs and locally elected councils.

 

1-12 CAV OPORD 07-04 (CHARGER REDEPLOYMENT), 8AUG07

 

Shifted the battalion’s focus to redeployment and relief-in-place (RIP) operations.

 

FRAGO 9X (Reconciliation) to OPORD 07-02 (CHARGER ARROW), 16SEP07

 

Note that this OPORD was never issued to subordinate companies, though a brief of its contents was presented to company commanders.  As is discussed in greater detail in the section on CLNs, this is the first comprehensive and official document on Reconciliation issued to the battalion.  Prior to this time the battalion’s execution of Reconciliation with Sunni Resistance Groups (SRGs) was based upon information gleaned from General Officer speeches, isolated taskings, and unclear/unofficial guidance from higher.