The chart above shows 1-12 CAV’s organic task organization as of November 2006 and for the majority of the deployment.  The support company, E/215 BSB, was attached from 215 BSB.  “Easy” company, as the unit was called, maintained maintenance sections within each of the maneuver companies.  Also note how the four maneuver companies each task organized one platoon.  This allowed the two infantry companies to operate with tanks as well as providing the two tank companies more flexibility with increased boots on the ground.  At times, the two tank companies further task organized their two infantry platoons in order to have two maneuver units.

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Attachments

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Throughout the year 1-12 CAV received the attachment of various enabling units as well as augmented by OPCON of several different maneuver units.  In terms of support units, 1-12 CAV was generally supported by 1-3 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, a civil affairs team (CAT A), a tactical psyop team (TPT) team, and a tactical HUMINT team (THT) team, for the entire deployment.  Two other enablers that supported 1-12 CAV on an as needed basis included military working dogs and signal intelligence.  Additionally, 1-12 CAV was supported by one Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) officer.  Non-organic or attached assets regularly and easily available included unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), air-weapons teams (AWT), combat camera, and indirect fires.  In terms of indirect fires, A/2-82 FA maintained a Paladin section at the DMC and was tracked under 1-12 CAV PERSTAT, although this battery was only ADCON to 1-12 CAV.

 

Following is a list of maneuver units attached to 1-12 CAV including approximate dates as per published OPORDs and FRAGOs:

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1.      B/6-9 ARS, attached to 1-12 CAV, strategically placed in Kan’an in order to free up D/1-12 CAV ISO of the battalion’s operations in other areas, 21JAN07-12APR07.

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2.      B/1-14 RSTA (Bronco), attached to 1-12 CAV, operated out of the Buhriz Iraqi Police Station (BIPS) in the Buhriz and Al Abarra AOs, 15JUN07-08AUG07.  This unit was attached to 1-12 CAV ISO of OPERATION ARROWHEAD RIPPER.

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3.      D/2-35 IN (Gundog), OPCON to 1-12 CAV, operated in the New Baqubah and Sebat Nisan AOs, 15JUN07-08AUG07.  This unit was attached to 1-12 CAV ISO of OPERATION ARROWHEAD RIPPER.

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4.      B/2-505 PIR (Panther), attached to 3-2 SBCT in Baqubah from 15JUN07-14SEP07.  From 11JUL07-04AUG07, 3-2 SBCT OPCON B/2-505 PIR to 1-12 CAV.  This unit was attached to 1-12 CAV ISO of OPERATION ARROWHEAD RIPPER.

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Other Significant Task Organization Changes in Baqubah (Levels higher than BN)

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1.      From 25MAR07-14SEP07, 5-73 RSTA (already OPCON to 3-1 HBCT), reorganized in order to place a majority of its forces in the Diyala River Valley,

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2.      From 23APR07-19JUN07, 5-20 IN conducts operations in Baqubah, OPCON to 3-1 HBCT, from 20JUN07-23AUG07 attached to 3-2 SBCT.

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3.      From 20MAY07-Current, 2-1 CAV, 4-2 SBCT IN controlled Khan Bani Sa’ad south and west of Baqubah after battle hand-off (BHO) with C/1-12 CAV.

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4.      From 20JUN07-26AUG07, 1-12 CAV attached to 3-2 SBCT ISO OPERATION ARROWHEAD RIPPER.

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5.      From 23JUN07-24AUG07, 1-23 IN conducts operations in Baqubah, 1-23 IN conducts operations as part of 3-2 SBCT.

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6.      From 24AUG07-Current, 1-38 IN attached to 3-1 HBCT in Baqubah, replaces 1-23 IN in west Baqubah,

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7.      From 15SEP07-Current, 2-23 IN attached to 3-1 HBCT, conducts battle-handover of DRV battle space from 5-73 RSTA, also assumes 3-1 HBCT Brigade battle space in Kanaan,

 

Descriptive Analysis

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The chart titled “Major Task Organization Changes in the 1-12 CAV AO” below, graphically depicts the change in force structure in Diyala as compared to the original 1-12 CAV AO (See the S2 section for a map of the first 1-12 CAV AO in November 2006).  Note that task organization prior to January 2007 is not shown due to limitations in Excel formatting; however, in the last two months of 2006 1-12 CAV was the only maneuver unit, other than military training teams (MiTT), Special Forces detachments, etc. operating in this original AO.

 

Looking at the Unit History section concerning such statistics as SIGACTS, CF Casualties, and EKIA it is obvious that Baqubah was a hot-spot for enemy activity in the last months of 2006 and in the first quarter of 2007.  The addition of B/6-9 ARS to Kan’an in early January was a 3-1 HBCT effort to reinforce 1-12 CAV internally.  Likewise, the addition of 5-73 RSTA to the DRV in late February was a brigade effort to allow 1-12 CAV to strategically realign its organic forces.  When both of these efforts failed to reduce the violence in Baqubah, MNC-I committed its’ operational reserve, 5-20 IN, specifically for operations inside the city of Baqubah.

 

5-20 IN began conducting operations in Baqubah on 23MAR07 and immediately encountered heavy enemy contact, sustaining multiple destroyed vehicles and numerous casualties within the first few hours of operations.  For the next two months 5-20 IN systematically conducted deliberate clearance operations in the main neighborhoods of east Baqubah.

 

Strategically, the “surge” was occurring, with additional brigades moving into Iraq when the decision was made to commit another three battalions to the clearance of Baqubah.  Also, the three month extension to a 15-month deployment was announced in April.  2-1 CAV shifted its forces to Khan Bani Sa’ad o/a 20MAY07 as a shaping operation to upcoming operations.  With the addition of 1-23 IN from Baghdad and the addition of another three infantry companies to Baqubah, OPERATION ARROWHEAD RIPPER began o/a 20JUN07 to liberate the city of Baqubah of Al Qaeda forces.  Also on this date, 3-2 SBCT formally assumed control of Baqubah.

 

Note that some minor task organization changes are not reflected in the graphics below.  An example of this is the temporary addition of the C/52 AT (Avalanche) company to 1-12 CAV ISO OPERATION WICKERSHAM I.  This change was brief and, additionally, did not affect overall forces in Baqubah because Avalanche was already a part of 3-2 SBCT forces in Baqubah.

 

Also note that, from the WARNO 9 to OPORD 01-07 for OPERATION ARROWHEAD RIPPER, that 1800 additional soldiers were on FOB WARHORSE, 300 additional soldiers on FOB GABE, and 1500 additional IA soldiers in Baqubah for this operation.  These numbers do not include forces such as the 2-1 CAV battalion that reinforced 1-12 CAV in Khan Bani Sa’ad, but that did not move to FOB WARHORSE.

 

At the height of OPERATION ARROWHEAD RIPPER there were 5+ maneuver battalions operating in an AO previously controlled by only one battalion (1-12 CAV, 1-23 IN, 5-20 IN, 5-73 RSTA, 2-1 CAV, and three additional infantry companies).